Maintaining U.S. National Security: How U.S. Overseas Agencies Like JUSMAG and USIA Shaped the Cold War to the Present
Following the Trump administration's dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which led to humanitarian crises around the globe, this implementation not only affects other countries but also undermines U.S. global power itself. The dismantling of USAID raises concerns among experts, especially as USAID has been one of the foremost tools of soft power for the U.S. since the Cold War. When did it all start? In the Cold War, the U.S. projected its power to the world via its overseas agencies, which oversaw military and economic assistance and boosted U.S. global status through public diplomacy. Apart from USAID, which oversaw economic assistance programs, there are other important overseas agencies, namely U.S. Overseas Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs), which go by many names across the globe, such as the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) or Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), which oversaw military assistance programs, and the United States Information Agency (USIA), also known overseas as the United States Information Service (USIS), which was responsible for public diplomacy, focusing on promoting American values and culture as well as anti-communist ideology. This article explores how JUSMAG/MAAG and USIA/USIS were formed and evolved during the Cold War, shaping U.S. influence around the world.
Entering the Cold War: U.S. Assistance to the Free World
The U.S. foreign assistance policy was formulated at the same time that the U.S. began to play a leading role on the world stage in the early days of the Cold War. Concerning the Soviet attempt to expand influence into Turkey and the growing Greek Communist forces in Greece in 1947, the U.S., under President Harry S. Truman, provided military and economic assistance programs to Greece and Turkey, leading to the establishment of MAAG to facilitate the provision of weapons, equipment, and training to the Greek and Turkish militaries. These MAAG units were later established around the world, from Europe and the Middle East to East Asia and Southeast Asia, to arm and train local soldiers and also facilitate their study at U.S. military institutes. Apart from supplying and training Washington’s allies with American weapons and military doctrine, MAAG also played a role in maintaining U.S. relations with local military leaders.
Apart from military and economic assistance, the U.S. also disseminated American ideology, values, and culture, as well as anti-communist sentiment via USIS throughout the world to promote the U.S. reputation. Consequently, these countries would support U.S. foreign policy toward other countries around the globe. Following the success of communicating information abroad and at home, and countering disinformation during World War II by the Office of War Information (OWI), the U.S., realizing the power of public diplomacy, expanded USIS, which oversaw U.S. information programs abroad, into new regions left with power vacuums due to the declining influence of European great powers. These regions included Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia. Thailand, for example, saw USIS swiftly enter after the war ended in 1945, and it was officially established in 1947. Additionally, in 1948, the Smith-Mundt Act was passed to “To promote the better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations.” This act laid the groundwork for U.S. public diplomacy.
USIS operations varied in the forms of media and activities, including printed materials, films, radio broadcasts (Voice of America: VOA), television, libraries, exhibitions, language institutes, exchange programs, and scholarships. In some areas crucial to U.S. national security, like Southeast Asia—especially Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand—USIS’s public diplomacy spread across all social classes, from cities to rural areas. All these efforts were aimed at promoting the U.S. image, propagating anti-communist sentiments, and, in some cases, such as in Thailand, supporting U.S. allies' local governments' legitimacy and stability.
Southeast Asia: The Battleground
From the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, the Korean War, and the growing strength of the Viet Minh in Indochina, Southeast Asia became a key strategic location for the U.S. Fearing that this region would fall into communist hands, President Dwight D. Eisenhower paid great attention to the region, which led to the development of the Domino Theory. This theory influenced U.S. foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. In 1954, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) policy on Southeast Asia stated that “The loss of Southeast Asia would have serious economic consequences for many nations of the free world and conversely would add significant resources to the Soviet bloc,” as the region was rich in natural resources and had significant potential as a market for the industrialized countries of the free world. The U.S. interest in Southeast Asia led to the strengthening and expansion of U.S. military, economic, and informational overseas agencies, such as MAAG Vietnam and JUSMAG Thailand in 1954, and the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953 to oversee USIS posts and their public diplomacy operations worldwide. This policy raised USIA's influence in Washington, challenging the Department of State. It is also important to note that these U.S. overseas activities carried out their responsibilities and collaborated with each other, all under the supervision of Washington through U.S. ambassadors in each country. In Thailand, for example, JUSMAG and USIS cooperated to conduct public diplomacy programs promoting anti-communist ideology, Thai national ideology, and cooperation with the U.S. and its free world allies, among the Thai military and the public.
From the 1960s to the early 1970s, the U.S. found itself deeply involved in Southeast Asia, especially in Vietnam and Thailand. During President John F. Kennedy's administration, in 1961, there were 8,000 American military advisors in Vietnam, but by 1963, their number surged to 16,000. In 1962, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was established, the U.S. military structure that controlled all military activities in Vietnam. The situations in Indochina accelerated U.S. activities in Thailand. After President Kennedy deployed U.S. military forces to Thailand in 1962 to deter communist aggression from Laos, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI) was established and merged JUSMAG Thailand into it. This measure was implemented to facilitate U.S. military operations in Laos and Vietnam and support the Thai in their counterinsurgency efforts. In addition to supporting the Thai military, MACTHAI also implemented public diplomacy through civic action programs to win the hearts and minds of the Thai people and prevent them from leaning toward communism.
For USIS, its operations spread across rural areas in Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos through the Mobile Information Team (MIT), which originated from the USIS post in Thailand. Rural areas, vulnerable to communist subversion, became a battleground for information warfare between the U.S. and the Communists. MIT disseminated printed materials, screened films, and brought small-scale development programs to each village to win the hearts and minds of the rural population. Moreover, MIT also served as a reconnaissance unit for the U.S. and host countries, monitoring communist activities through its mobility and the relationships between MIT personnel and villagers. In Thailand, MIT field reports contributed to counterinsurgency planning by Thai and U.S. officials and informed other large-scale development units supported by USAID on which areas they should prioritize.
Entering the Vietnam War, Support and Combat
After the U.S. military became directly involved in the Vietnam War in 1965 during President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, the influence of these U.S. overseas agencies reached its pinnacle. Alongside military operations in Vietnam, Washington utilized public diplomacy and psychological operations by establishing the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), which integrated USIS, MACV, and USAID to promote public support for the U.S. in South Vietnam.
Amid the tensions of the Vietnam War, Thailand also faced a rising communist insurgency within the country. However, while the U.S. military played a leading role in Vietnam, the U.S. Embassy in Thailand did not want Thailand to face overmilitarization in counterinsurgency, as was the case in Vietnam, which, on the contrary, led to the growth of communist forces. The U.S. Embassy, with support from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other civilian agencies, stepped in to prevent MACTHAI from influencing the Thai military's counterinsurgency methods. Still, large-scale military assistance continued to support the Thai military.
U.S. military and economic assistance improved Thailand's security and developed its economy. Meanwhile, U.S. public diplomacy supporting the Thai government helped popularize Thai leadership among the public. Consequently, these efforts gave Washington the privilege of using Thailand as a base for military and covert operations throughout Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, Thailand became a laboratory for the development of U.S. military technologies. Some of these facilities were so novel and sophisticated. For example, during the late Vietnam War, Task Force Alpha at Nakhon Phanom Air Base was designed to attack the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) strategic route called the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It used a highly advanced computer system to receive data from sensors dropped along the Trail, which were picked up by EC-121R relay aircraft. This data would then be translated into visual display monitors to locate suspected activities, leading to the launch of jet fighters over the Trail, where computers discharged laser-guided bombs automatically. Additionally, to address the risk of losing highly trained crew members and EC-121R aircraft to the PAVN, a remotely controlled pilotless drone was developed and tested at Nakhon Phanom.
Despite the failure of U.S. overseas agencies in Vietnam when U.S. military withdrew from the war during President Richard Nixon's administration, which led to the defeat of South Vietnam in 1975, Thailand’s experience might be considered a partial success. The Thai military’s involvement in the Vietnam War, the Laotian Civil War, and counterinsurgency within the country reflected the success of JUSMAG and USIS Thailand, especially in terms of the morale of Thai soldiers. According to a report from a JUSMAG officer, despite hardships in military camps or injustices in promotions, low-ranking soldiers still had high morale and performed effectively. In addition, Richard A. Ruth's study argued that volunteering for the Vietnam War among young men in rural northeastern Thailand led them to perceive themselves as subjects of the state to an unprecedented degree. Moreover, JUSMAG programs for Thai military officers, both in-country and those brought to study in the U.S., educated Thai officers who would rise to leadership positions in the armed forces. This laid the foundation for the U.S.-Thai military special relationship that continues to this day.
These indicate that while JUSMAG armed the Thai military with American equipment and doctrine, USIS also contributed to integrating these Thai soldiers into Thai national ideology, which they may have encountered from youth through USIS programs and later encountered again in the armed forces. U.S. military assistance to Thailand may be considered as successful as it was during the Cold War in the Greek Civil War, the Armed Forces of the Philippines in suppressing the Hukbalahap Rebellion, and the Republic of Korea Armed Forces in maintaining stability against internal subversion and preparing for the Korean War.
Apart from the Thai military, USIS public diplomacy operations influenced all Thai social classes, from language institutes, exchange programs, and scholarships that formed American-educated Thai upper and middle classes who would later become involved in governmental, economic, or academic circles of the country and have influence in shaping Thailand's foreign policy toward the U.S., to printed materials, films, and radio stations that influenced the Thai public in adopting American culture, lifestyle, and anti-communist sentiment. The evidence reflecting this can be seen after the 6 October 1976 event, which led to a military coup and the return of power to the right-wing government. U.S. embassy reports and Thai newspapers indicated that the Thai public supported this government, and some expected that the U.S. would return to help them fight communists amid the rise of communist powers in Southeast Asia and within the country.
After the Vietnam War, Entering New Conflicts by Backing Allies
After the Vietnam War, significant operations of U.S. military assistance appeared in Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia, such as supplying military assistance to the Contras, a Nicaraguan right-wing paramilitary group, during the late 1970s to the 1990s. However, U.S. support for the Contras tainted the country's reputation on the world stage, as it resulted in the Iran-Contra Affair and human rights violations. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, President Jimmy Carter and his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, launched Operation Cyclone, in which the CIA provided military assistance to the Mujahideen in their attacks on the Soviet Union's soft Central Asian underbelly, dragging the Soviets into a perpetual war and weakening them enough for Eastern European countries to break free from the Iron Curtain in the 1990s.
But supplying allies with arms and training might not be enough to win hearts and minds. In 1976, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program was established to provide military education and training to foreign forces. This program aimed to build mutual relationships between the U.S. and foreign militaries and increase the awareness of foreign military personnel regarding international norms, such as human rights. It was a powerful program in forging trust and relationships with foreign military students who had the potential to hold high positions in the military or politics in the future, which was crucial for U.S. national security.
For the USIA, during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, as National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State, neglected the USIA and ceased or cut back on some major USIS programs around the world. These actions left the USIA with an uncertain future. However, after 1976, President Jimmy Carter, who recognized the importance of public diplomacy, attempted to reorganize the USIA, but to no avail. The USIA became Washington's focus again after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which caused tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to resurge. President Ronald Reagan, seeking to restore the U.S. reputation, signed National Security Decision Directive 77 to strengthen U.S. public diplomacy and invigorated USIA’s role in policy-decision circles in the White House, similar to its role during the Vietnam War. In 1981, Reagan formulated Project Truth, which aimed to counter Soviet propaganda, Project Democracy, and the Afghan media project, which trained the Mujahideen in news gathering, footage creation, and still photography that were disseminated to the world.
‘By the grace of God, America won the Cold War’
When the Soviet Union collapsed, there were indicators that public diplomacy played a part in it. Nicholas J. Cull, a public diplomacy historian, reveals that Eastern European leaders praised radio broadcasts for keeping hope alive and spreading news that led to the return of freedom, while Soviet citizens learned about Western prosperity through exhibitions and radio, fueling their aspirations and pressuring the Kremlin into a losing competition. For the U.S., public diplomacy has been utilized to minimize damage to the U.S. public image, maintain relations with allies, prevent the enemy's ability to win, and hold the imagination of the developing and nonaligned world. Joseph Nye, the architect of the term 'soft power,' also argued that public diplomacy helped undermine faith in communism behind the Iron Curtain.
However, instead of being remembered as one of the U.S. agencies that helped reshape the Cold War, like USAID leading the democratization of Eastern Europe, USIA quickly fell into decline due to internal conflicts within the agency and questions in Congress about its necessity, along with the push to reduce budgets for U.S. foreign policy apparatuses. Despite USIA’s distinguished role in maintaining the U.S. public image during the First Gulf War and its adaptation to new media, in 1991, USIA was abolished, and its functions were transferred to the State Department. One of the most important U.S. agencies of the Cold War faded into history.
The Dilemmas of U.S. Global Power
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S. became the world's dominant power. U.S. military assistance continued to spread across the globe, with JUSMAGs and other overseas SCOs operating under different names in many regions. Entering the post-9/11 era, the U.S. spent almost $73 billion in military aid to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2020. These military programs, such as IMET, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), aimed to arm and train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in fighting terrorists. For Iraq, after the disbanding of its army following the 2003 invasion, the U.S. spent $20 billion rebuilding the new Iraqi military. However, despite the billions of dollars in support, the Taliban returned to power after U.S. troops withdrew in 2021, and the initial lack of will to fight by the Iraqi Army during the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) offensive in 2014 raised questions about U.S. military assistance. Nevertheless, it still benefits the U.S. in maintaining its relations with allies; it is a double-edged sword for Washington.
After the termination of USIA, which was one of the U.S. soft power tools in maintaining allies and countering disinformation and misinformation from the opposition, U.S. public diplomacy faced challenges from the War on Terror. The Department of State’s public diplomacy campaign, such as the 'Shared Values Initiative,' aimed at building trust with Muslims around the world; however, this led to controversy. Moreover, the Department of Defense tended to implement public diplomacy approaches more since the Cold War, as indicated by military aid programs and civic action programs. However, as the U.S. became deeply entangled in the War on Terror, its global image diminished. This highlighted the importance of effective U.S. public diplomacy from the civilian side, which needs to lead and integrate with the military side in order to maintain U.S. global power.
In President Barack Obama’s tenure, the U.S. approach to public diplomacy shifted to engaging more with the world based on dialogue and mutuality, while providing military assistance to many countries to maintain a network of allies.
Where Do We Go from Here?
The 2020s might be one of the significant periods in history: U.S.-China competition, the war in Ukraine, Middle East conflicts, and South China Sea tensions—each of these determines U.S. global status. However, as the Trump administration tries to scale down foreign assistance by attempting to shut down USAID and using military assistance as a bargaining chip, these actions harm not only U.S. global status but also its domestic situation, swaying the U.S.’s old allies to seek alternatives without the U.S. or leaving them in uncertainty, as is happening in Europe and Asia. Will USAID face the same fate as USIA? That remains to be seen, but one thing is certain: U.S. foreign assistance is still vital to U.S. national security.
Sources (Books and Thesis)
Alfred McCoy. In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of US Global Power. Haymarket Books; Chicago, 2017.
Donald Stoker, Ed. Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007. New York: Routledge, 2007.
Fredrik Logevall. Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam. New York: Random House, 2012.
Nicholas J. Cull. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Panuwat Arunrung. “The Roles of Joint United States Military Advisory Group Thailand and United States Information Service under the Containment Policy in Thailand during 1947-1976.” MA thesis, Thammasat University. 2023.
Richard A. Ruth. In Buddha's Company: Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2010.
Sean R. Randolph. The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950 – 1985. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies University of California, 1986.
Spencer C. Tucker. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Thomas G. Paterson. "The Quest for Peace and Prosperity: International Trade, Communism, and the Marshall Plan," in Bernstein, Barton J. ed. Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970.
